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In merger cases brought under section 7 of the Clayton Act,1
trial often does not take place until several years after the merger.
Because section 7 requires a predictive judgment as to the proba-
bility that a merger may substantially lessen competition,2 there is
a temptation to test probabilities against the particular post-merger
history. A recent decision of the Supreme Court may be inter-
preted as indicating that post-merger evidence is not admissible.
This note will consider whether the Court has put forward a general
rule excluding post-acquisition evidence in light of the factual situ-
ation of that case and the methods used in reaching the finding of
illegality.
In FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co.3 the Court held that Procter
& Gamble's 1957 acquisition of the Clorox Company violated section
7. Procter & Gamble was the leading firm in the detergent field.
Clorox, with 49 percent of total liquid bleach sales, was the domi-
nant firm in that industry, and together with its principal rival,
115 U.S.C. § 18 (1964), fornwrly 38 Stat. 631 (1914), provides:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indi-
rectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and
no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade
Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another
corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line of com-
merce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition
may be substantially to lessen competition, or tend to create a
monopoly.
See Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Eco-
nomics, 74 HARv. L. REV. 226, 234-37, 247 (1960) [hereinafter cited as
Bok], for a review of the legislative history of the Celler-Kefauver Anti-
Merger Act, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), which amended section 7. The techni-
cal additions and deletions are shown in Brown Shoe Company v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 311 n.18 (1962).
2 FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592, 598 (1965); United
States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362 (1963); Brown Shoe
Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 322-23, 332 (1962); United States v.
E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 589, 598 (1957); cf. Standard
Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 308-09 (1949).
"58 F.T.C. 1203 (1961) (remand order), followed, [1961-1963 Transfer
Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 15,573 (1962) (summary of the FTC hearing
examiner's second report), aff'd as modified, [1963-1965 Transfer Binder]
TRADE REG. REP. 16,673 (FTC 1963), rev'd and vacated, 358 F.2d 74
(6th Cir. 1966), rev'd and affirming Commission, 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
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Purex, accounted for almost 65 per cent of national sales. Six
firms sold over 80 per cent of the nation's liquid bleach. The Court
found that "all liquid bleach is chemically identical," and attributed
Clorox's dominance to heavy advertising and promotional expendi-
tures. Procter's acquisition of Clorox would probably injure com-
petition because it eliminated Procter as a potential entrant and
"the substitution of the powerful acquiring firm for the smaller,
but already dominant, firm may substantially reduce the competitive
structure of the industry by raising entry barriers and by dissuad-
ing smaller firms from aggressively competing. . ..
The Court focused its attention upon three probable anticom-
petitive effects of the merger. First, the merger increased oppor-
tunities for anticompetitive behavior, such as predatory pricing.5
Second, the merger produced certain undesirable economies, chiefly
in advertising.' Third, the merger caused structural alterations,
through the elimination of a potential entrant into the concentrated
industry, that would probably lessen competition. Also, Procter's
merging into the industry had raised barriers to any further entry.7
As pointed out in a concurring opinion by Mr. Justice Harlan,
the majority did not give much consideration to the question of the
proper weight to accord post-acquisition evidence.8 This was in
many ways the main source of difference between the Commission
and the Sixth Circuit. The FTC hearing examiner had decided
that the merger violated section 7, but the full Commission had
found, at first consideration, that the record did not offer the Com-
mission "an informed hindsight upon which it can act," but rather
allowed it to place "too much reliance upon treacherous conjecture." 9
Thus, the examiner was directed to consider post-acquisition devel-
opments. However, on second consideration, the Commission
stated that in this case post-acquisition evidence was irrelevant and
held the merger unlawful on the original record.'0 The court of
appeals reversed the Commission, holding that the record, and par-
ticularly the post-acquisition history, did not support the claimed
'386 U.S. at 578.
386 U.S. at 575.
'386 U.S. at 579.
7 386 U.S. at 580-81.
'386 U.S. at 591 (concurring opinion of Harlan, J.).
'58 F.T.C. 1203, 1207 (1961).
10 [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. RE'. 16,673, at 21,587
(FTC 1963).
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probability of anticompetitive effects i" The Supreme Court re-
versed the court of appeals and largely adopted the Commission's
method of analysis. The Court, by its brusque treatment of the
point, seemed to hold that post-acquisition evidence is generally
irrelevant; in fact, the Commission's finding may have been de-
termined by the nature of the post-acquisition evidence introduced
by Procter, and not by any position that all types of post-acquisition
evidence should be excluded.
Throughout the proceedings Procter argued that post-acquisition
developments should be considered to test the probabilities of anti-
competitive effects.' Since the merger was conglomerate, 3 it did
not have the effect of automatically foreclosing to competitors any
market outlet or source of supply as in a vertical merger.14  Nor
did it have the effect of automatically eliminating a competitor as
in a horizontal merger.'5 Therefore, Procter argued, analysis of
the anticompetitive potentialities of the merger required a broader
scope of inquiry. The fact that the record failed to show any in-
stances where the Commission's predictions had become reality
meant that these claimed probabilities were mere possibilities and
therefore too speculative to support a finding that the merger was
unlawful.' 6
1358 F.2d at 84.
12 386 U.S. at 591 (concurring opinion of Harlan, J.).
1 Conglomerate mergers in their pure form involve the merger of com-
panies that are neither customers, suppliers, or competitors. Pure con-
glomerate mergers are rare. As pointed out by Professor Turner, manage-
ment rarely enters a field in which they have no experience. Turner,
Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HARv. L. REv.
1313, 1315 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Turner].
"The simple vertical merger is the acquisition of a firm that buys the
product sold by the acquirer, or sells a product bought by the acquirer. It
may lead to an extension of market power from one level to another, as
when a manufacturer obtains the main or primary source of a vital material.
Furthermore, it may impair competition by foreclosing markets to competi-
tors or to prospective entrants. Turner 1315, 1317.
"
5 The simple horizontal merger involves acquisition of a firm producing
an identical product or a close substitute and selling it in the same geographic
market. Horizontal mergers eliminate competition that exists between two
firms, and further increase market concentration. Turner 1315, 1317.
Few mergers are clearly vertical or horizontal, but may include charac-
teristics of both. For example, in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370
U.S. 294 (1962), the merger was horizontal in some ways, vertical in
others. Brown Shoe was primarily a shoe manufacturer, but also retailed
some of its shoes. Kinney, the acquired firm, was primarily a retailer of
shoes, but manufactured some also. The Court treated the merger as
predominantly vertical.
" "Mere possibility" will not establish the statutory requirement that
[Vol. 46
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The Commission argued that section 7 clearly does not require
the existence of actual anticompetitive effects, but rather a con-
clusion as to the probability of various possible economic consequen-
ces of the merger. Except in the most obvious cases, economic
theory does not permit completely confident judgments even when
all possibly relevant facts have been assembled and considered.' 7
Therefore, the addition of inconclusive post-acquisition evidence
would serve no useful purpose but rather would tend to lengthen
and complicate the litigation. The post-merger history of Procter-
Clorox tended neither to confirm nor disprove the probability of
anticompetitive consequences because it was difficult to know to what
extent post-merger developments were caused by the merger, and
not by other factors. 8 Furthermore, dependence upon post-acquisi-
tion evidence offered by the respondent showing a paucity of actual
anticompetitive developments would allow controls to be evaded by
the dissimulation of market power during the period of observa-
tion." This policy consideration is similar to the rule against self-
serving statements.20  Thus, broadening the range of inquiry to
include factors incapable of clear resolution might inhibit rational
decision-making,2 exhaust limited enforcement funds and curb the
effectiveness of the Commission.22
Commissioner Elman reasoned that consideration of five factors,
all present in Procter, might permit adjudication of the conglomerate
merger with as much facility as percentage ratios afford in the case
of a horizontal or vertical merger :23
the effect of the merger "may be" to lessen competition substantially. United
States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 598 (1957).
" [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 16,673, at 21,573-74
(FTC 1963).
Is Id. at 21,587.Is Id. at 21,574. Cf. 386 U.S. at 592 (concurring opinion of Harlan, J.).
20 See 6 J. WIGMORE, EvIDENCE §§ 1714, 1732; 2 Am. JUR.2d Adminis-
trative Law § 385 (1962).
2" [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 16,673, at 21,574
(FTC 1963); cf. Bok 246; Elman, Rulemaking Procedures in the FTC's
Enforcement of the Merger Law, 78 HARV. L. Rzv. 385 (1964); Stigler,
Mergers and Preventive Antitrust Policy, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 176 (1955).
22 [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 16,673, at 21,574
(FTC 1963); cf. 386 U.S. at 592 (concurring opinion of Harlan, J.).
"With 5 million U.S. companies in a 790 billion dollars annual economy,
that's a large order for any Federal agency-particularly one with only
1,150 employees and an annual budget of 14 million dollars." NEwswEEK,
Oct. 23, 1967, at 82.
20 [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. RE'. 16,673, at 21,580
(FTC 1963). Cf. Elman, The Need for Certainty and Predictability in the
1968]
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1. Is there a size disparity of the acquiring firm relative to the other
firms in the industry;
2. Is the market so concentrated as to make potential, rather than
actual, competition significant, and what is the position of the ac-
quired firm within this market;
3. Does the merger involve the elimination of a significant potential
entrant;
4. What is the position of the acquiring firm in other industries;
5. What sorts of economies are enabled by the merger?
The Commission did not consider whether one or more of these
factors taken separately might be dispositive of the case.24 Rather
the merger of Procter and Clorox was condemned because of the
probability of three anticompetitive consequences arising out of a
conjunction of all five factors. An analysis of these three conse-
quences will necessarily involve discussion of evidentiary require-
ments and will highlight the commission's general approach to post-
acquisition evidence.
I. Increased Opportunity for Anticompetitive Behavior
Predatory pricing and its milder counterpart, disciplinary pricing,
were two manifestly anticompetitive practices made more possible
by the merger of Clorox and Procter.
Predatory behavior can be classified into three types: price war-
fare, promotional expenditure warfare, and use of Clorox as a
loss leader. All three types were considered distinct possibilities
by the Commission."
Because Procter would be able to cover its losses with funds
obtained from both other geographic bleach markets and the other
product markets in which it was active, such as detergent, it might
sell Clorox at a price lower than customary profit-maximizing con-
siderations would dictate for the purpose of driving other compet-
ing bleach producers out of the market. Procter might achieve the
same effect by greatly increasing advertising and promotional ex-
penditures and eliminate rivals by using expensive procedures be-
Application of the Merger Law, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 613 (1965); Address by
Chairman Dixon, 14th Annual Spring Meeting of the Section on Antitrust
Law, American Bar Association, in Washington, D.C., April 14, 1966, 5
TRADE REG. REP. 50,142 (1966).
"4 [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. " 16,673, at 21,581(FTC 1963).
2" Id. at 21,579. See 386 U.S. at 576.
[Vol. 46
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yond their financial means. 26  Or Procter might use Clorox as a
loss-leader, in order to yield off-setting profits on other Procter
products, such as detergent. Clorox might be sold at prices below
out-of-pocket costs for the purpose of increasing sales of compli-
mentary products. Though not done with the intent to destroy
rivals, this practice might have the same effect.2 7
Disciplinary pricing, or short-term predation done with the
intent of preventing competing bleach producers from challenging
Clorox's dominance, was a further possibility in Procter. Moreover,
the possibility that Procter would resort to disciplinary pricing or
out-right predation was interpreted by the Commission as a possi-
ble psychological restriction upon competition in the liquid bleach
industry.2
8
There is some controversy among commentators as to whether
the mere possibility of predatory or disciplinary behavior should be
a negative factor in merger litigation.2 9 It is argued that clear-cut
examples of such behavior are largely lacking, and that furthermore,
if such behavior were effective it would violate other antitrust stat-
utes. For example, predatory pricing as an "attempt to monopolize"
is a clear violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act,8" and predatory
pricing in one of several geographic markets violates the Robinson-
Patman Act."' Loss-leader underpricing might be attacked as an
"unfair method of competition" or an "unfair act or practice" under
section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.2 Nevertheless, the
Court apparently held that the increased possibilities of such be-
havior were negative factors in finding against the merger.
" [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TADE REG. REP. 16,673, at 21,564
(FTC 1963).
22 Id. at 21,578-79. See Turner 1346-49.
28 [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE. REG. REP. 16,673, at 21,579
(FTC 1963). See 386 U.S. at 579, n.3.D E.g., Turner 1346. Professor Turner argues that the possibility of
predatory disciplinary behavior "seems so improbable a consequence of
conglomerate acquisitions that it deserves little weight in formulating anti-
merger rules based on prospective effects." However, the possibility of
such behavior has played a major part in some merger cases. See, e.g.,
309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (Arrow Foil case); 233 F. Supp. 718 (E.D.
Mo. 1964) (Cupples case).
81 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964). See American Tobacco Co. v. United States,
328 U.S. 781 (1946). See generally, Turner, Antitrust Policy and the Cello-
phane Case, 70 HARv. L. REv. 281 (1956).
81 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1964). Cf. United States v. Jerrold Electronics
Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
12 15 U.S.C. § 46 (1964). Cf. FTC v. Nat'l Lead Co. 352 U.S. 419
(1957).
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Post-acquisition evidence demonstrating that the respondent
had engaged in such anticompetitive behavior could be held by the
enforcement agency to be decisive against the merger.83  Yet, the
failure of such a practice, largely within the respondent's control,
to materialize would not be, under Procter, significant. In the
former, the evidence would be relevant; whereas, in the later it
would be irrelevant due to the obvious possibility that the respon-
dent "held back."
II. Undesirable Potential Economies
Both the Court and the Commission recognized that Clorox
would enjoy substantial competitive advantages over other liquid
bleach producers because of the use of Procter's substantial adver-
tising discounts.24 In fact one of the reports by Procter's promotion
department emphasized that Procter would be able to make more
effective use of Clorox's advertising budget due to the large dis-
counts given Procter, as a major advertiser, by television networks
and magazines.
Commissioner Elman argued that such potential economies were
undesirable.36 Because all liquid bleaches were chemically identical,
such advertising was merely persuasive rather than informational.
Clorox, already the most heavily advertised bleach, was the most
expensive.17 As he saw it, price competition beneficial to the con-
sumer had given way to brand competition beneficial only to the
seller. Cost advantages enabling still more extensive advertising
" See, e.g., FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
There, Consolidated had attempted with some success, to follow a policy of
reciprocal buying, or reciprocity. Simple "reciprocity" is a threatened
withdrawal of orders if the products of an affiliate cease being bought, or
a conditioning of future purchases on the receipt of orders for the products
of that affiliate. However, "reciprocity" was not a factor in Procter.
"'386 U.S. at 580; [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
16,673, at 21,576-77 (FTC 1963).
" [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 16,673, at 21,577
(FTC 1963). These discounts were very substantial. For example, for
the same expenditure Clorox could, by using the Procter discount, obtain
33 per cent more network television advertising, and it would be of a
superior type.
:'These advertising economies could be classified as false economies be-
cause they stemmed from sheer size, rather than greater efficiency. See
Turner 1323-26.




could, therefore, only impair price competition further, to the detri-
ment of the consumer.38
To the extent that Procter had used its advertising discounts
to buy advertising for Clorox, it was the utilization of undesirable
economies. The failure of Procter fully to realize these savings was
of little significance, for obviously it could do so.3 9 Evidence show-
ing that despite full utilization of discounts there had been no ob-
vious change in competition might be relevant, though such an ap-
proach would necessarily involve the objection that the Commission
simply was not equipped to enter into the sort of wide economic in-
vestigation that the evaluation of such an occurrence would entail.
On the other hand, evidence that such competitive advantages
available to Clorox caused competitors to merge might be admissible
because it would involve a much narrower investigation. However,
such an approach would not favor the respondent, but would instead
be used by the government to show the decisive nature of such
potential economies.4" At this point it may seem that the govern-
ment always wins when post-acquisition evidence is involved. But,
if this be true to any extent, it is only because the evidence is rele-
vant or manageable when offered by the government, but irrelevant
or unmanageable when offered by the respondent.
III. Structural Alterations
Conglomerate mergers do not obviously change the actual com-
petitive structure of a given market because at least on the face of
things they involve merely one company stepping into the place of
another company which is neither a competitor, supplier or customer
of the acquirer. However, certain subtle changes in the competitive
relationships may be significant.
Two primary considerations in Procter were the loss of a po-
tential entrant and the raising of substantial entry barriers.
Procter, at the time of the merger, was a successful, experienced
" Id. One is reminded of cosmetic-manufacturer Charles Revlon's com-
ment upon criticism of large advertising expenditures because they increased
the price of the item: "We sell hope."
[1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REF. 16,673, at 21,587.
The criticism of advertising, in the Commission's opinion particularly,
has led to speculation that it might indicate the start of direct government
regulation of such marketing practices. See Bork, The Supreme Court and
Corporate Efficiency, FORTUNE, Aug. 1967, at 92. Quaere if such regulation
might be possible under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,
note 32 supra.
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firm in the household products field. It was familiar with the pro-
duction and marketing of a complimentary line of products and had
a history of internal expansion into related fields such as the abrasive
cleanser industry.4 1 Procter was one of a very few companies
powerful enough to challenge Clorox's dominant position with some
hope of success. Procter had considered independent entry into
the liquid bleach industry prior to its acquisition of Clorox.4 2 From
these facts the Commission concluded that Procter was a uniquely
qualified potential entrant. The liquid bleach industry was highly
concentrated. Actual competition, while not entirely absent, was
not vigorous. Under such circumstances potential competition from
a likely entrant might serve the same function that actual competi-
tion served in other more competitive markets. For example, the
Commission considered it likely that firms within the liquid bleach
industry had curbed the trend towards high oligopoly profits in
order to make entry as unattractive as possible. Therefore, Proc-
ter's merging into the industry by acquiring its potentially greatest
competitor, Clorox, eliminated "one of the last factors tending to
preserve a modicum of competitive pricing and business policies in
the liquid bleach industry. .. .
Clorox, at the time of the merger, enjoyed certain competitive
advantages that could discourage outside entrants: product differen-
tiation and a reserve of accumulated consumer preference; some
financial reserves; and considerable pricing flexibility. Though
such factors had not deterred Procter's successful penetration of
the abrasive cleanser market, such factors, supplemented by Procter's
financial size and aggressive marketing techniques, tended to make
entry barriers, in the appraisal of possible entrants, very high. Fur-
thermore, expansion into new regional markets contemplated by
existing bleach producers other than Clorox might be deterred.
High entry barriers, made even higher by the Procter-Clorox mer-
ger, decreased the possibility of new entrants, and correspondingly
diminished any residual potential competition effects."
Evidence of post-acquisition entry, conceivably by firms such
" In 1957 Procter introduced "Comet" cleanser and within 20 months
obtained 36.5 per cent of the national market, though faced with substantial
competition from established cleanser manufacturers, such as Purex (Bab-
0). [1963-65 Transfer Binder] T.ADE REG. REP. 16,673, at 21,564 (FTC
1963).
12 Id. at 21,564-65.
'Id. at 21,584.
"Id. See Turner 1358.
[Vol. 46
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as Colgate or Lever Brothers, into the liquid bleach industry might
be relevant insofar as it would tend to disprove the argument that
Procter was one of a very few potential entrants whose entry re-
suilted not only in a significant diminution of potential competition,
but raised entry barriers.45 However, there are at least two possible
objections to the use of such a post-acquisition entry as a means to
refute probabilities. First, entry by a large firm does not necessarily
imply that entry by smaller firms has not been effectively foreclosed
by the merger. Second, the transformation of a predominantly
small-firm industry into one dominated by large firms may be un-
desirable in light of Congressional concern for the preservation
of allegedly beneficial small-firm competition.46 Such post-acquisi-
tion evidence would be unlikely to succeed as a refutation of the
government's arguments, and because of its negative implications
might further harm the respondent's case.
There are two other possible structural alterations discussed by
the Commission. Though they bear upon the issue of potential
competition, they are more directly used to interpret post-acquisi-
tion developments. These two alterations are "triggered mergers"
and possible broader definition of the relevant product market.
The Commission considered it likely that Procter's merger into
the market might "trigger" defensive mergers among the smaller
firms in the liquid bleach market. Such triggered mergers might
be prompted by a desire to achieve greater competitive equality with
Clorox, or to protect market shares in the face of a much more
powerful competitor. The Court concluded that second-ranked
Purex's merger with fourth-ranked Fleecy White was such a trig-
gered merger.47 This merger, it was argued, was the result of "the
lesson of Erie," where Purex's attempt to enter a market dominated
by Clorox brought on a price and promotional war. The result of
this competitive warfare was that Purex withdrew from the market,
and Clorox's market share increased.48
'rBut cf. United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964);
United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
"Accord, United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 273 (1966) ;
United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 367 & n.43 (1963);
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320, 344 (1962); United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945) (Hand,
J.); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 588, 592(S.D.N.Y. 1958).
17 386 U.S. at 578.
'8 386 U.S. at 579 n.3.
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Furthermore, Commissioner Elman stated that certain post-
acquisition developments may require the consideration of their
effects upon potential competition within a given product market.40
For example, the post-merger development of a related item may
itself influence competition within a given market. This situation
was presented in the Commission's later decision against the acqui-
sition of the S.O.S. Company by General Foods.50 The fact situa-
tion was very similar to Procter,5' but there were several major
differences. For one thing, General Foods had not been in any
meaningful way a potential entrant into the steel wool soap pad
industry.52 Furthermore, following the merger several large firms
outside the steel wool industry had introduced plastic scouring pads.
These were in some ways acceptable substitutes for steel wool soap
pads. In the cleaning of Teflon-coated cookware they were directly
competing, and in fact displacing, steel wool soap pads from a grow-
ing part of the market. The majority of the Commission defined
the relevant market as the steel wool soap pad market. Commis-
sioner Elman, dissenting, argued that the majority should have at
least taken into account the influences that these post-acquisition
developments probably would have on the real and potential com-
petitive forces within the steel wool soap pad industry 3 Thus, post-
acquisition evidence in this context may be significant and may be
entertained by the Commission.
IV. Conclusion
Three general observations concerning the admissibility of post-
acquisition may be helpful.
First, to the extent that specific anticompetitive consequences
within the control of the respondent have not materialized, this
failure to act will not be significant. The enforcement tribunal
would probably resist any attempt by the respondent to introduce
such post-acquisition evidence on the ground that it was self-serving
' [1963-65 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 16,673 at 21,584 (FTC
1963).
" General Foods Corp., [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
17,465 (FTC 1966).
"I1d. at 22,732-42. Here the majority set forth an eleven page "Com-
parison of Operative Facts in the General Foods and Procter & Gamble
Cases."
" Id. at 22,746 (dissenting opinion of Commissioner Elman).
"Id. at 22,748-49 (dissenting opinion of Commissioner Elman).
(Vol. 46
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and might have been manufactured by the holding back of market
power during the period of observation.
Second, if such anticompetitive consequences have become ap-
parent, the government is almost certain to use them against the
legality of the merger. 54
Third, the enforcement tribunal is unlikely to consider evidence
showing that there has been no overall change in the market. Such
evidence would be open to the objection that its evaluation would
require that type of general economic investigation of all possibly
relevant factors that the Commission wanted to avoid. The Com-
mission would argue that such a broad survey would not be likely
to be of any benefit, even if it were possible.55
The attitudes of the Federal Trade Commission are significant
because they probably are largely shared by the Antitrust Division
of the Justice Department. Both agencies have been successful in
persuading the Supreme Court to adopt their arguments.56 In Proc-
ter, the majority of the Court apparently approved of the Com-
mission's handling of the case.57 Thus the attitudes of the Com-
mission are probably those of the majority of the Court.
In light of the Court's earlier decision in the duPont-General
Motors case,58 the Government's attitude towards post-acquisition
evidence as set forth in Procter may become very significant. In
duPont, the purchase of 23 per cent of General Motors stock was
successfully attacked thirty years after the acquisition. The Court
held that a merger may be attacked "whenever the reasonable like-
' This "double-standard" is criticized in Day, Conglomerate Mergers and
"The Curse of Bigness", 42 N.C.L. REv. 511, 557 (1964); Reilly, Conglom-
erate Mergers-An Argument for Action, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 522, 536 (1966);
Solomon, Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 53 A.B.A.J. 137, 140-41 (1967).
" Cf. Cook, Merger Law and Big Business: A Look Ahead, 40 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 710, 713 (1965); Phillips, Some Implications of the Supreme Court's
Antimerger Decisions, 21 Sw. L.J. 429, 440-41 (1967); Rill, The Trend
Toward Social Competition Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 54 GEO.
L.J. 891, 901 (1966).
'0 See, Note, 45 N.C.L. Ray. 1015, 1019 n.27 (1967).
" One Commissioner has stated that the Court "is in full agreement with
the Commission's approach to section 7 enforcement against conglomerate
acquisitions." Address by Commissioner John R. Reilly, Antitrust Section
of the Ohio State Bar Association, in Dayton, May 12, 1967, 5 TRADE REG.
REP. 50,170, at 55,229 (1967). See also, J. ScoTT & E. ROCKE ELLER,
ANITRUST AND TRADE REGULATION TODAY: 1967, 116 (1967).
" United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
See Bromley, Business' View of the duPont-General Motors Decision, 46
GEo. L.J. 646, 653-54 (1958).
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lihood appears that the acquisition will result in a restraint. . ... "
The willingness of enforcement tribunals to consider not only prob-
able anticompetitive consequences, but also their actual manifestation
becomes significant when the respondent is denied in many in-
stances from using the absence of such consequences to refute the
Government's arguments.
However, the respondent may be able to use certain types of
post-acquisition evidence, especially of developments arising beyond
its control and going to the core of the government's analysis of
potential competition.6" Two examples-post-merger entry and the
development of a related product that tends to broaden the relevant
market-have already been mentioned. Furthermore, it should be
clear from the discussion that relevant economic data gathered
after the merger and not at all related to a respondent's post-acqui-
sition behavior or probable anti-competitive effects generally should
not be excluded merely because the studies, made after the merger,
technically make such data "post-acquisition evidence." For example,
a respondent will probably not make studies of relevant market or
product class until after the merger when suit is brought; the ad-
missibility of such evidence clearly should not be questioned.
More immediately, post-acquisition evidence will be decisive in
the treble-damages action filed by Purex Corporation against Proc-
ter & Gamble."' Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides for treble-
" 353 U.S. at 592.
60 See Procter & Gamble Co., [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG.
REP. 16,673, at 21,574 (FTC 1963):
Specifically, we think that the admission of post-acquisition data
is proper only in the unusual case in which the structure of the market
has changed radically since the merger-for example, where the
market share of the merged firm has dwindled to insignificance-
or in the perhaps still more unusual case in which the adverse effects
of the merger on competition have already become manifest in the
behavior of the firms in the market.
For an example of disastrous mergers, compare Dresser Industries, Inc.,
[1961-1963 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 1 16,513 (FTC 1963), with
Fruehauf Trailer Co., [1965-67 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 17,260
(FTC 1965). However, neither of these involves the conglomerate situ-
ation. Observe that while future developments may cause the reopening of
a case, they will not cause the Commission to modify a decree. Compare
National Tea Co., [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 17,463
(FTC 1966), with Reynolds Metals Co., 56 F.T.C. 743 (divestiture order),
56 F.T.C. 1680 (1960) (petition to reopen denied), aff'd, 309 F.2d 223 (D.C.
Cir. 1962).
6 Cincinnati Enquirer, Oct. 24, 1967, at 38, col.2. The suit, filed in
federal district court in Los Angeles, asks 174.5 million dollars in damages,
Purex, at the time of the merger of Clorox and Procter, had total sales of
50 million dollars, but this includes sales of a variety of household products
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damages to "any person who shall be injured in his business or
property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws."
Purex's complaint alleges that Procter-Clorox "engaged and con-
tinued to engage in severe and sustained predatory price cutting."6 2
Implicit within Purex's claim for relief is the requirement that there
be actual post-merger injury. However, neither the Court nor the
Commission found that Procter had actually engaged in any definite
anticompetitive behavior. Had there been any such behavior it
seems highly unlikely that the Commission would have failed to
use it against the merger, if only because an analysis based upon the
actual manifestation of predatory pricing would have been far
simpler. Therefore, it will be interesting to see to what extent, if
any, the Commission might have considerably simplified their task
by the use of such evidence.
K. G. ROBINsON, JR.
Attorney and Client-Compensation of Indigent's Counsel in
Federal Post-Conviction Proceedings
The North Carolina Supreme Court has recently held that coun-
sel appointed to defend an indigent defendant in the courts of North
Carolina cannot be compensated by the state for work done in the
federal courts to vacate the state conviction.1 The attorneys re-
and not just liquid bleach. Observe that section 5(b) of the Clayton Act
suspends the running of the statute of limitations during the pendency of
government proceedings and for one year thereafter.
02 Id.
State v. Davis, 270 N.C. 1, 153 S.E.2d 749 (1967), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 828 (1967). The attorneys were appointed in Mecklenburg County
Superior Court in 1959 to defend Elmer Davis, Jr. who was charged with
rape and murder under ch. 112 (1949) N.C. SESs. L. (required counsel
for indigents charged with a capital offense). The conviction was appealed
to the North Carolina Supreme Court which affirmed, State v. Davis, 253
N.C. 86, 116 S.E.2d 365 (1960). After a petition for rehearing was denied,
the attorneys won a stay of execution and sought certiorari from the United
States Supreme Court which was denied, Davis v. North Carolina, 365 U.S.
855 (1961). Attorneys then petitioned the federal district court for a
writ of habeas corpus which was denied, Davis v. North Carolina, 196 F.
Supp. 488 (E.D.N.C. 1961). On appeal the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed and remanded the case to the district court to determine whether
Davis' confession was obtained within the bounds of due process, Davis v.
North Carolina, 310 F.2d 904 (4th Cir. 1962). The district court again
refused to grant the writ, Davis v. North Carolina, 221 F. Supp. 494 (E.D.
N.C. 1963) and the court of appeals upheld the lower court in a 3-2 decision,
Davis v. North Carolina, 339 F.2d 770 (4th Cir. 1964). The Supreme Court
granted certiorari and in Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966),
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